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ABSTRACT 
This thesis continues the discussion of the role of interests and values as determinants of 
Canadian foreign policy by examining closely their treatment in the Martin government’s 2005 
foreign policy statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (RPIW). The purpose of the 
thesis is to capture the expression and interplay of interests and values within RPIW vis-à-vis 
past foreign policy expressions.  It begins by presenting a literature review of selected works by 
Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh, Kim Richard Nossal and Cranford Pratt, which will reveal the state 
of the discourse on the role of interests and values in Canadian foreign policy.  It proceeds with a 
textual analysis of RPIW: Overview, comparing its structure and content to those which appear in 
Canada in the World (1995), Competitiveness and Security (1985) and Foreign Policy for 
Canadians (1970).   
This textual analysis ends with the conclusion that RPIW not only incorporates past 
criticisms by Denis Stairs and Kim Richard Nossal, but also seems to embrace the interests-
driven, values-based orientation put forward by Jennifer Welsh in At Home in the World.  
However, as the thesis moves on to a comparison of RPIW: Overview and RPIW: Development, 
the thesis exposes the fact that in RPIW: Development, the interests-based, values-driven 
approach seems to have been abandoned in favour of policies, such as the section titled “Good 
Governance,” that use values as policy drivers in and of themselves.  The thesis concludes that 
development, despite the Martin government’s deliberate efforts in RPIW, appears to be a 
consistently altruistic, values-driven exercise.  If aid effectiveness has any hope of being 
strengthened, it must be done under both an acknowledgement of the altruistic character of the 
development enterprise, as well as careful thought as to what the desired outcome of Canadian 
development policy ought to be. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the literature in the field of Canadian foreign policy has been preoccupied 
with the question of what role interests and values have in shaping policy.  Works by Kim 
Richard Nossal, Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh, Cranford Pratt and others have examined the 
question from a variety of angles, and have each put forward their criticisms and prescriptions 
for change.   
The debate about the role of interests and values in foreign policy reached a crescendo in 
the mid-1990s with the publication of Canada in the World (CW), the foreign policy statement 
issued by the government of Jean Chretien in 1995.  The main criticism of this document was 
that it identified values as foreign policy goals in and of themselves.  Kim Richard Nossal 
attacked the document, claiming that it encouraged “…the idea that the objective of our foreign 
policy is to show others in the world the superior virtue of the “Canadian way.”
1
 He saw this 
approach as an illiberal, un-Canadian and, ultimately, flawed policy that “…discourages 
Canadians from thinking about the hard choices that have to be made about defending and 
protecting their country’s interests in a world where others are trying to create the world they 
want.”
2
   
The debate over the role of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy waned over 
the following decade but resurfaced in 2005 with the publication by the government of Paul 
Martin of a new foreign policy document entitled Canada’s International Policy Statement: A 
Role of Pride and Influence in the World (RPIW)
3
. Among other purposes, this document sought 
                                                
1
 Nossal, Kim Richard, “‘The World We Want’?  The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals, and Interests in 
Canadian Foreign Policy,” http://www.cdfai.org/currentpublications.htm. Retrieved April 22, 2006. 13. 
2
 Ibid, p.13. 
3
 Canada’s International Policy Statement:  A Role of Pride and Influence in the World:  Overview. Her Majesty  
 2 
to address the criticisms of Nossal and others, explicitly bringing interests back to the forefront 
of Canadian foreign policy while acknowledging a role for values at the base.   
 The purpose of the thesis is to continue the discussion of the role of interests and values 
as determinants of Canadian foreign policy by examining closely their treatment in the Martin 
government’s RPIW.  The document appeared to accept the notion that values, when turned into 
policy objectives themselves, represent inadequate, impossible drivers of policy, and that a 
values-reflecting, interests-driven policy project can be the only coherent foundation for effective 
foreign policy. Yet upon closer inspection one finds that the document remains, in certain 
respects, still susceptible to Nossal’s criticism. Notably in the section of RPIW entitled RPIW: 
Development, the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law continue to be viewed 
as objectives for Canadian foreign policy makers, driving the policy forward instead of 
undergirding it. From such a finding the thesis raises the question of whether the values-
reflecting, interests-driven policy framework is adequate for understanding the determinants of 
Canadian foreign policy.  
 Chapter two is a literature review, designed to capture the debate that has unfolded 
among scholars regarding the role of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy. Kim 
Richard Nossal and Denis Stairs first drew attention to the dangers of a values-as-goals approach 
to foreign policy, as set forth in the 1995 foreign policy document CW. The issue was 
subsequently taken up by Jennifer Welsh who, when consulted by the Martin government during 
the drafting of RPIW, proposed that Canada’s foreign policy in the new century should be 
values-based and interests-driven. The literature review concludes by citing an alternative, and 
possibly more viable, framework for understanding the role of values and interests in Canadian 
foreign policy, found in Cranford Pratt’s advocacy of “humane internationalism”. 
                                                
the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005. 
 3 
 Chapter three compares RPIW with three previous official foreign policy statements, 
namely Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC),
4
 published in 1970; the 1985 foreign policy 
review, Competitiveness and Security (CS);
5
 and the 1995 review, Canada in the World (CW).
6
  
This chapter will compare the structure and content of RPIW with each of the three previous 
statements, and will shed some light on the way interests and values have been articulated over 
the previous 35 years.  This will, in turn, prepare the reader for a close examination of the section 
in RPIW dedicated to development, in which an interests-driven, values-based approach seems to 
break down. 
 Although the authors of RPIW sought to consciously avoid articulating values as goals, 
my analysis of RPIW: Development in chapter four reveals a development document that would 
seem to fall back into the values-as-goals approach in 1995’s CW.  In many sections of RPIW: 
Development, the chosen three values seem tempered by the comparatively clear expressions of 
interest, but in a few key areas, a values-projection project seems unavoidable.  The thesis pays 
particular attention to the example of the goal of good governance promulgated in RPIW: 
Development.   The call for good governance is an unmistakable call for intervention at a 
fundamental level, requiring real changes in target countries, and is a good example of 
unchanged values-as-objectives.  Another example can be found in its support for increased 
multilateralism, which appears again to be a goal in and of itself.  
 Although this thesis is designed to provide an account of how RPIW, notably within 
RPIW: Development, fails to deliver an interests-based, values-driven development policy, the 
                                                
4
 Canada, External Affairs, International Development: Foreign Policy for Canadians.  Ottawa:  Queen’s Printer for  
Canada, 1970. 
5
 Canada, External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada’s international relations.  Ottawa:   
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985. 
6
 Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World.  Ottawa:  Minister of Supply and Services  
Canada, 1995. 
 4 
analyses below must lead to the question of whether or not development is an inherently 
altruistic, interventionist exercise.  Chapter five will come to the conclusion that, despite 
powerful arguments that values as development policy goals are inefficient, illiberal and doomed 
to failure, and despite the creation of a comprehensive foreign policy document that explicitly 
espouses these criticisms, the Martin government’s failure to extend the interests-driven, values-
based approach to RPIW: Development represents a strong indication that development must be 
different. 
 5 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Debate on the sometimes - conflicting roles of interests and values has particular 
significance for scholars of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA).  Strains within 
the debate have focused on specific ODA policy issues, such as the use of tied aid. However, the 
true core of this debate is found in the works of those who examine the nature of the continually 
shifting relationship between values and interests within ODA policy, and who are concerned 
with what constitutes the most effective mix of the two.  For the purposes of this thesis, the 
writings of Kim Richard Nossal, Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh and Cranford Pratt, all of whom 
focus their work on ODA, will be of central importance. 
Denis Stairs 
 Although they tend not to be as prescriptive as the works of the other authors discussed 
below, works by Denis Stairs capture an important facet of the interests and values debate.  In his 
2003 piece for International Journal, Stairs introduced a series of articles designed to advise 
newly installed Prime Minister Paul Martin, and in so doing, articulates a number of important 
criticisms of past policy.   
Stairs begins by offering his readers an overview of Canada’s current international 
position, including the shifting security relationship between Canada and the United States that 
arose after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as well as the general effect America’s 
post–Cold War unilateralism has had on the international community as a whole.  It soon 
becomes clear that Stairs has a pragmatic orientation, and his analysis of Canada’s position vis-à-
vis the United States calls for the maintenance of healthy Canada-US relations as Canada’s top 
diplomatic priority:   
 6 
For some, this [priority] is an unhappy thought.  It smacks of subordination.  At 
one time, academics of critical disposition would have described such a 
relationship as neo-colonial.  Perhaps it is, but whether it is or not, there is a sense 
in which the issue is no longer a matter of political choice at home.
1
 
 
Stairs’ pragmatic orientation extends to the question of values and interests in Canadian foreign 
policy.  In language that is markedly blunt, he continues his analysis of the current Canadian aid 
practice: 
The inflated claims that are imbedded in the rhetoric of declaratory policy escalate 
further in response to weakening performance on the one hand and intensifying 
interest group pressures on the other.  The vocabulary of values—always a cheap 
concoction—assumes a greater prominence.  The premise is that it will warm the 
mood and cool the criticism.  The spinning of tales—tales not false, perhaps, but 
certainly canted—becomes an increasingly valued and admired art as the policy 
establishment struggles to bridge the gap between what well-intentioned 
Canadians think and what the government really is doing.
2
 
 
When Stairs examines the current policy, he sees disappointing outcomes, possibly, he seems to 
hint, born of unrealistic goals.  Worse yet, he sees in the policy troubling government attempts to 
hide these outcomes from Canadians by using empty rhetoric to deflect criticism of deficient 
policy outcomes. 
However disparaging his critique, Stairs is ultimately concerned with how the incoming 
prime minister will respond to these pressing policy questions, and he quickly shifts the focus of 
his article toward what the new administration ought to do to address these concerns.  Although 
it is unclear whether Stairs shares the complaints of those who favour the expansion of Canada’s 
development projects, it is clear that he firmly believes that our expectations of Canada’s 
involvement in the developing world ought to be lowered and our priorities streamlined: 
                                                
1
 Stairs, Denis, “Challenges and opportunities for Canadian foreign policy in the Paul Martin era,” in International 
Journal.  vol.  LVIII, no.  4 (Autumn 2003).  Canadian Institute of International Affairs.  485. 
2
 Ibid., 489–90. 
 7 
The grandiose and self-serving rhetoric so common now in our foreign policy 
pronunciamentos could be quietly abandoned in favour of more honest (and 
hence, much more cautious) accounts of what is likely to be feasible in the real 
world of social engineering abroad, both generally and in terms of policies suited 
particularly to Canada … No one ought to be allowed—ever—to assert that 
attaching transformational conditions—economic, social, or political—to the 
allocation of Canadian development assistance is an effective mechanism to 
encourage fundamental economic, social or political change.  Such simple-
minded argumentation, rooted in single-variable explanatory propositions, cannot 
withstand careful scrutiny.  It can, however, gravely corrode the public’s 
understanding of the complexity of the issues involved and what their long-term 
resolution will entail.
3
 
 
Whatever one’s epistemological orientation, Stairs’ criticism strikes at a troubling disconnect 
between the rhetoric within Canada’s aid policy and the reality on the ground.  Like many others, 
he makes an appeal for the setting of realistic goals within more specialized policy areas, 
focusing our aid resources in a few areas and locations where we can be expected to have a long-
term developmental impact.   
 But what of interests and values?  Stairs seems to suggest that values are merely window 
dressing, and appear in declarative policy mostly to disguise and distract.  However valid this 
may be as a criticism of the existing policy, he leaves us wondering whether or not he envisions 
a role for values within any effective policy.  In  “Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian 
Foreign Policy,” also written in 2003, he presents his “unabashedly subjective assertions with 
which other observers are almost certain to disagree,”
4
 and suggests that Canadians’ rhetorical 
displays may merely be a symptom of declining influence, musing that “an ostentatious claim to 
superior virtue can be the last refuge of the impotent.”
5
   
 In the latter article, Stairs critiques the 1995 foreign policy statement, CW.  He identifies 
security, prosperity, and values and culture as Ottawa’s chosen three pillars, a list of policy 
                                                
3
 Ibid., 491–492. 
4
 Stairs, Denis, “Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in International Journal.  vol.  LVIII, no.   
2 (Spring 2003).  Canadian Institute of International Affairs.  239. 
5
 Ibid., 240. 
 8 
drivers he considers fairly honest and reasonable.  However, he finds immediate cause for 
concern in passages related to the third pillar.  In their exhortations of reputed Canadian 
bilingual/multiculturalist/democratic virtue abroad, echoed in the media by many non-
governmental organizations of the day, Stairs sees an astonishing level of presumptive arrogance.  
The propagation of the idea that “Canadians think more virtuously than others, and hence that 
others should be encouraged to think more like Canadians,”
6
 is not only absurdly egoist, but 
potentially dangerous when applied to a country’s foreign policy.   
 Stairs raises three issues.  The first, that Canada’s foreign policy ought to ensure that 
Canadians’ cultural achievements are put on display abroad, is the most instrumental and 
innocuous of the issues, and receives little criticism from Stairs.  The second issue, however, is 
one he finds much more problematic, and is in his view responsible for “clutter[ing] up the 
intellectual premises”
7
 on which serious policy rests.  For some reason, the notion that Canadian 
policy should be based upon Canadian values has caught on within the Canadian public, and has 
been echoed by a receptive government.  On the surface, such a notion seems obvious, for who 
would call for a policy that reflects un-Canadian values? For Stairs, it is nowhere near that 
simple, and the ambiguity of the concept of values itself feeds into the troubling gap between 
rhetoric and real policy outcomes. 
 At first, the idea that Canadian values ought to drive policy appears to be basic and easy 
to understand: “Whatever Canadians want, after all, is presumably what they value.”
8
  And what 
they want, at the most basic level, is first security, then prosperity, and finally “the comfort that 
comes from the belief that their behaviour is sufficiently ‘moral’ to allow them to feel free of 
                                                
6
 Ibid., 242. 
7
 Ibid., 245. 
8
 Ibid., 246. 
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guilt.”
9
 Beyond this level of thought, things get progressively more difficult.  Does security 
depend upon the democratization of other countries, or is security an expression of military 
might? Does prosperity depend upon liberal economics, or on another approach?  Such questions 
of policy are highly subjective, and the values that are supposed to drive them leave a great deal 
to be interpreted. 
 Arguments of policy practice aside, a disturbing implication arises from this use of 
vaguely-articulated values: 
Is it possible that Canadians (within government and without) are deceiving 
themselves when they say, in reference to foreign policy, that they are acting on 
the basis of their “values,” implying in the process that this is both distinctive and 
notable? The corollary of such an implication is that others, less nobly inclined in 
their politics than Canadians, are pursing something less, something “base” and 
self-serving—like their “interests.”
10
 
 
It is this false dichotomy—that values are moral and interests self-serving—that clouds the 
debate surrounding values and interests.  And it is this dichotomy, a notion that appears both 
explicitly and implicitly within the literature, that reveals a pernicious brand of self-delusion on 
the part of its articulators. 
 The self-delusion is easy to spot.  It appears every time our “values” are abandoned 
whenever an incompatible “interest” comes to the fore.  It is certainly evident to Stairs, who 
notes the declining dollar amounts earmarked for Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) over the decades and the corresponding heightened values rhetoric that accompanied the 
cuts.  Canadian politicians know that they can safely reduce our commitment to aid without 
comment from most of the electorate, and this truth points to a more accurate, if nastier, 
conception of the Canadian public: 
                                                
9
 Ibid., 246. 
10
Ibid., 248. 
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[The truth is] that Canadians may care to some degree about helping the citizens 
of the third world, and the spectacle of their government doing so may offer to 
those who think of such matters a small measure of psychic reward in the dark 
hours of a sleepless night.  But when push comes to shove, they still care far less 
about helping the impoverished, the diseased, and the oppressed abroad than 
about ensuring the delivery of their more cherished public services at home … 
there is increasing evidence that the government’s comforting rhetoric is in 
danger of becoming far too successful, so that Canadians are internalizing it and 
taking it seriously at face value.  In short, they are coming to believe what they 
are told, and in the process are losing their grip.
11
 
 
This candid assessment takes Stairs to his third issue, namely, “whether Canadians ought 
actively to propagate - even to proselytize - their putative values abroad.”
12
 
 This notion that Canadians should project certain values abroad, though not new, has 
come into fashion in recent years, a move that Stairs views as an abandonment of traditional 
Canadian diplomatic practice.  Whereas Canada was previously hesitant to sermonize and 
intervene in the affairs of other countries, we now have “value-imperialism of the weak.”
13
  If we 
set aside the damage such an impotent policy could do to Canada’s diplomatic reputation, the 
most troubling feature of this kind of policy is the above-mentioned delusion it fosters at home.  
Stairs invokes the example of multiculturalism, a central expression in the “‘Canadian values’ 
display”
14
 Canada conducts.  The implication is that the peace Canada enjoys is somehow 
engendered by Canadian-style multiculturalist politics, a gift that Canadians can share with less-
peacefully-coexisting peoples the world over.  Stairs agrees that such a system would be worth 
propagating—if only it existed in the first place.  While we do enjoy a relatively peaceful 
pluralist existence, Stairs believes this is more a function of our relative abundance of space and 
resources:  
                                                
11
 Ibid., 250–51. 
12
 Ibid., 251–52. 
13
 Ibid., 252. 
14
 Ibid., 253. 
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Canadians can cultivate a peaceful society in the midst of their diversity because 
they have room for it and because they have the capacity to pay for it.  In effect, 
they buy their way out of the zero-sum games.”
15
 
 
 For Stairs, the conclusions are clear.  Our political behaviour, from our pluralist politics 
to our development programs, is a function not of our values, but of our happy circumstances.  
Merely proselytizing based on what seems to work in Canada cannot have any effect on those 
systems or governments into which we pour our misguided development energies, and there is 
nothing in our experience indicating that Canada would be prepared to devote the resources 
needed for such a monumental effort. 
 Ultimately, Stairs asserts, “Canadians are very much as others are.  They simply live in 
more fortunate circumstances.”
16
  Accordingly, he calls for a foreign policy that looks honestly at 
the amount of resources and scope of programming Canada is truly willing to offer, and for 
Canada’s international development opportunities to be selected with great care.  As for the 
ultimate balance of values and interests, or even whether or not the role the two concepts have in 
Canadian foreign policy should be re-evaluated, the answer to this question is left for another 
time or for other authors. 
Kim Richard Nossal 
 One of the most comprehensive articulations of the interests argument can be found in 
Kim Richard Nossal’s “Mixed Motives Revisited,” published in 1988.  This piece offers a broad 
overview of his position, and establishes Nossal’s statist, realist and liberal orientation.  In the 
article, Nossal questions the orthodox trinity of motives - economic, political and philanthropic - 
that is often ascribed as determinant of Canada’s foreign policy, and maintains that an approach 
to foreign aid that holds Canadian interests paramount is the only effective policy strategy.  To 
                                                
15
 Ibid., 254 - 55. 
16
 Ibid., 256. 
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deny the state’s capacity to act as an autonomous political actor, Nossal argues, is to 
fundamentally misunderstand the nature of all international political relationships, and central to 
this must be an understanding of where Canada’s best interests lie. 
 Nossal asks, “What accounts for a Canadian development assistance policy that is by all 
accounts so limited, and so wanting in terms of achieving development objectives for the 
South?”
17
  His answer - that the existing model overlooks the motives and interests of the donor 
state - is the key to Nossal’s vision for Canadian ODA.  If we operate in a world where states are 
the primary actors, it naturally follows that the state will use its considerable power to shape its 
programs so that its own interests prevail.  With this in mind, Nossal points to the state’s 
“substantial material interests in prestige, organizational maintenance and limiting expenditures, 
and that these motives more accurately account for, and explain, the Canadian government’s 
interest in, and attachment to, a development assistance programme that is both limited and self-
serving.”
18
   
 A more recent piece by Nossal, entitled “‘The World We Want’? The Purposeful 
Confusion of Values, Goals and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy,” offers more insight into 
Nossal’s specific criticisms of a values-driven Canadian foreign policy.  The article is primarily 
concerned with the 1995 foreign policy statement, which, he argues, explicitly holds the 
projection of Canadian values as a primary foreign policy goal.  In Nossal’s view, such a project 
will always be deeply flawed and fundamentally un-Canadian, and represents a radical departure 
from Canada’s traditionally liberal approach, which maintains that the world is pluralist.  While 
Nossal would never suggest that values have no place in policy, he takes issue with their 
manifestation as policy objectives in and of themselves; instead of values determining policy, 
                                                
17
 Nossal, Kim Richard, “Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada’s Interest in Development Assistance,” in Canadian 
Journal of Political Science.  vol.  XXI, no.  1 (March 1988).  45. 
18
 Ibid., 45. 
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they became policy objectives of their own, an approach that, in Nossal’s view, created a 
dangerous disconnect between policy and interests in the 1995 document.   
 In “‘The World We Want’?,” Nossal presents five criticisms of values-driven policy 
creation.  He argues that the 1995 policy document is philosophically illiberal, neocolonial and 
hypocritical.  He also argues that it is practically impossible to implement, costly and potentially 
dangerous to Canada’s interests and survival. Canadians are encouraged to ignore the importance 
of interests in conducting an effective foreign policy; thus the document draws the focus away 
from the problem of how we defend ourselves and our interests in a world where others are 
trying to do the same.  In Nossal’s view, values still matter, but the best policy drivers are 
interests; if we can create policy that is driven by interests, while still acknowledging that our 
interests are informed by our values, we will effectively address a major flaw in the 1995 foreign 
policy document. 
Jennifer Welsh 
 Despite a few important epistemological differences, Nossal and Welsh arrive at very 
similar conclusions about the role of values and interests in Canadian foreign policy.  In key 
works, including her 2004 book At Home in the World, Welsh promotes the idea of the 
engagement of individuals and groups in Canada in international affairs, as agents of policy 
change.  But even with these differences, Nossal and Welsh both articulate a interests-driven, 
values-based view of Canadian policy formation.   
 Initially, many of Welsh’s works on this subject may seem to downplay interests in 
favour of the notion that “[a] country’s foreign policy is a reflection of who its people are: What 
they value, what they seek to change, and what they are willing to stand up for.”
19
 While it is true 
                                                
19
 Welsh, Jennifer, “Reality and Canadian foreign policy,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (eds).  Canada 
Among Nations: Split Images.  Montreal and Kingston:  McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005. 
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that Welsh is concerned with the connection between articulating values as Canadians and policy 
as Canada, it is equally true that she advocates an interests-driven policy for which values 
provide both a guiding core and a long-term vision.   
Welsh expanded upon this idea in “Fulfilling Canada’s Global Promise,” an article that 
appeared in the issue of Policy Options timed to coincide with the release of RPIW.  Through the 
use of the rhetorical question “If the US is the main object of our external relations, and security 
is their main subject, does Canada even need a foreign policy at all?”
20
 Welsh presents her vision 
of Canada as “testament to a broader set of political and social objectives”
21
 that must be 
reflected within Canada’s foreign policy.   
 In rejecting the idea of Canada as a country whose national purpose is “to buy and sell 
goods and services with other countries,”
22
 Welsh argues that if such a characterization were 
true, Canada would have ceased to be independent from the United States a long time ago.  
Instead, Welsh posits that “the very existence of Canada, as a political entity that runs east-west, 
defies the cool rationality of the economists.”
23
  The nature of our 21
st
 century world, she 
believes, calls for a diversified and robust foreign policy that seeks international collaboration 
(and in the case of poorer nations, capacity-building) to deliver security and prosperity in Canada 
and the rest of the world.  This includes planning for a world where “future superpowers are 
firmly embedded in international institutions and have been ‘socialized’ to cooperate with others 
in the management of common problems.”
24
 
                                                
20
 Welsh, Jennifer, “Fulfilling Canada’s Global Promise,” in Policy Options.  vol.  26, no.  2 (February 2005).  57. 
21
 Ibid., 57. 
22
 Ibid., 57. 
23
 Ibid., 57. 
24
 Ibid., 57. 
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 Drawing attention to Canada’s immigration and refugee policy and the nature of our 
“both isolated and exposed”
25
 geography, Welsh calls for an accentuation of Canadian history 
and national identity in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy.   
Central to her argument is the fact that 
[p]ublic opinion research reveals that Canada is a country deeply interested in 
foreign policy, whose citizens are strongly oriented toward taking an active role 
on the world stage and willing to commit Canadian troops in a wide array of 
scenarios.  As a consequence, Canadians—to a greater degree than Americans—
want more spending on overseas development assistance, more engagement with 
the UN, and more involvement in trade agreements.
26
 
 
The rest of this passage criticizes Canadian governments for failing to make the spending trade-
offs needed to support such programs, as well as their weak support of internationalism. But the 
most revealing aspect of the above statement for the purposes of this thesis is the significance 
Welsh attaches to these failures.  She suggests that the thrust of Canadian foreign policy may 
need to be rethought in the face of these new realities.  Professional diplomacy, she argues, now 
competes with other organizations and individuals who have found it necessary to operate 
globally without government intermediation.  Canada as a global entity has come to represent not 
just our government, but also Canadians, and is  
ultimately a network of people and values, which extends beyond the 
geographical hub of the 49
th
 parallel.  While it may be true … that Canada’s 
influence in the world is declining in terms [of] the traditional categories of 
federal spending on defence, diplomacy and development, this does not 
necessarily mean that Canadians are staying at home.
27
    
 
Unlike Nossal who takes a strictly realist position, Welsh calls upon Canadians to have a 
part in defining national interests.  Yet while framing those interests differently from Nossal, she 
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arrives at some strikingly similar conclusions about what such interests would look like, as well 
as what role values would have in shaping them. 
 Similarly, Welsh strikes a balance between values and interests, calling for a core set of 
values that would serve as the base from which our interests will be formed and, in turn, drive 
Canadian foreign policy.  In her book At Home in the World, she envisions a new role for Canada 
as international model citizen, and presents an idea of foreign policy that is conscious of the roles 
both values and interests play in its formation.  Her steps toward designing a strategic, effective 
foreign policy call upon Canada to re-examine Canadian core values and to articulate Canadian 
interests clearly.  For Welsh, it is important that Canada “walks the walk” at home and on the 
international stage, but it is also vital that these values inform the decisions we make and the 
interests we advance.   
 Acknowledging the undefined character of the Canadian national identity, Welsh argues 
that Canadians tend to coalesce around a set of guiding values, which she identifies as 
“democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.”
28
  As values go, these three are easy to support, 
and it would be difficult to find an industrialized country opposed to them.  She argues that the 
greatest challenge comes not in espousing them, but instead in articulating what these values 
actually mean and require of us.  Citing the expanding US mandate vis-à-vis Iraqi democracy as 
a prime example, she draws attention to the difficulty of defining and differentiating the 
identified values, and emphasizes the need for a dialogue about how democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights must fit together. 
 The ties these values have with each other, she argues, can be complex and lead to 
conflict.  The democratic rise of Adolf Hitler, the primacy of the Canadian courts on same-sex 
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marriage, and Russia’s “illiberal democracy” are compelling evidence of the inconsistencies that 
can arise when these values converge.  Upon examination of Canada’s system of governance, it 
becomes clear that we are governed by  
a very particular constellation that combines representative government, an 
impartial and independent judiciary, and a charter of civil and political rights that 
are both negative (for example, freedom from cruel treatment) and positive (for 
example, the right to due process) … we live under a mixed government, not a 
purely democratic one, [and it] requires careful balancing and fine-tuning.  We 
should be proud of this model, while being very clear about exactly what it 
entails.
29
 
 
Many have argued that Canada’s unique expression of democracy, rule of law and human rights 
is an ideal gift best exported and shared with the developing world.  But while it may be the 
height of condescension to suggest that there are some nations of people who cannot be free, the 
question of whether or not it is even possible to export democratic institutions remains valid. 
 Welsh’s observations, with her particular emphasis on Iraq, lead her to conclude that 
there is something distinctly untenable about the sorts of institutions that are “granted” by others.  
Accordingly, she observes in younger Canadians a powerful aversion toward the idea that their 
values ought to be imposed on others, in part because of its association with current US foreign 
policy, but also because of the rise of pluralism in Canada.  Our appreciation of difference, she 
argues, is what accounts for our success as a country, and should also be the driving force behind 
Canada as a “model citizen” in the world.  Not to be mistaken for a call to inaction, Welsh 
envisions our attachment to pluralism as a guiding force driving Canadian foreign policy toward 
facilitation instead of institutional export, a focus she sees as a more effective way of 
encouraging global peace and stability. 
 However, it is not enough for Canadians to be clear about what drives and defines us 
abroad.  The second element of Welsh’s foreign policy vision calls upon Canadians to reject the 
                                                
29
 Ibid., 2004, 197. 
 18 
popular but ill-conceived notion that “while other countries have interests, we have values.”
30
  
When Canadians are content to pretend that we are somehow above the world of power politics, 
we lose the opportunity to engage in any meaningful way with the world in general, preferring 
instead to sermonize in isolation rather than work toward constructive international 
collaboration.  However, when we are clear about which Canadian interests are being pursued, 
and always under the cohesive influence of our values, positive and collective action is possible. 
 By far the most marked point of departure in this work is Welsh’s conception of how 
interests and values must work in tandem.  She rejects the entire idea that interests and values are 
best regarded as being in a state of competition with each other, “as if the former were selfish 
and narrow and the latter ethical and internationalist.”
31
  Policies formed with a keen sense of the 
role both interests and values must have will expand a country’s conception of its own national 
goals and will better reflect the character of today’s globalized international system.  She uses a 
quotation from British Prime Minister Tony Blair to capture this point: 
The critics will say: but how can the world be a community? Nations act in their 
own self-interest.  Of course they do.  But what is the lesson of the financial 
markets, climate change, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation or world 
trade? It is that our self-interest and our mutual interests are today inextricably 
woven together.
32
 
 
To Welsh’s thinking, values and interests start to merge as the world’s problems are brought into 
focus as problems shared by all nations. 
 The criticisms and visions of Nossal and Welsh clearly had a role in shaping the policy 
directions taken in each section of RPIW. Its sections on defence, diplomacy, development and 
commerce, to varying degrees, contain explicit statements to the effect that Canadian foreign 
policy will be influenced by values, but driven by interests.  However, any extension of this 
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approach to the area of development raises questions about whether or not such an approach is 
even possible: with the nature of ODA being rooted in altruistic, humanitarian outcomes that are 
necessarily outward-looking in scope, can Canadian ODA programs ever escape a degree of 
values-driven policy? Simply put, is ODA fundamentally different from other Canadian foreign 
policy areas? In marked contrast to Stairs, Nossal and Welsh, Cranford Pratt answers this 
question in the affirmative. 
Cranford Pratt 
 Cranford Pratt’s work on Canadian ODA is preoccupied with an analysis of the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), tracing the shape and motivating factors of its 
various aid programs over the decades.  In a 1994 volume of essays edited by Pratt, titled 
Canadian International Development Assistance Policies:  An Appraisal, he offered his 
thoughts, on the eve of the 1993 federal election, on the direction in which Canadian ODA was 
headed.  The volume, as a whole, was concerned with enumerating and criticizing the driving 
forces behind Canadian ODA, ultimately concluding that a mix of “bureaucratic forces with their 
own designs on the aid expenditures, and the corporate lobbies that wanted to ensure that CIDA 
served domestic economic interests much more forthrightly”
33
 had captured control of the CIDA 
policy formation process, leading to confusion and a general retreat from what Pratt terms 
‘humane internationalism.’  While many of the finer details of his analysis are outside of the 
scope of this thesis, Pratt’s analysis assumes that humane internationalism, that is “[an] 
acceptance that the industrialized states have ethical obligations relating to global poverty”
34
 
ought to inform Canadian ODA policy.   
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 In the two chapters written by Pratt, titled “Canadian Development Assistance:  A 
Profile” and “Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development Assistance Policies,” it 
becomes clear that he endorses humane internationalism as the only ethical driver of Canadian 
ODA policy: 
The challenge is to ensure that both CIDA and the government become much 
more responsive both to the ethical imperative and to Canada’s real and 
substantial long-term interests, which require what the Winegard Report had 
urged – a substantial aid program that concentrates on reaching and helping the 
most destitute nations and people.  It is, at heart, an ethical issue and a political 
challenge.
35
 
 
It is important to situate the essays in this volume in the context in which they were written.  
Pratt and the other authors in the volume were writing out of a concern about a possible policy 
shift caused by the upcoming election. Pratt’s own contributions provided a historical treatment 
of CIDA policy that went back to 1977: 
The year 1977 seemed for most chapters the most appropriate year from which to 
begin.  That year was, or so a number of us argue, a turning point in the history of 
CIDA:  the government began a sustained and successful effort to ensure that 
CIDA’s policies and programs reinforced and promoted other major public 
policies which the government valued but that were essentially extraneous to the 
humanitarian and development objectives that were putatively central to CIDA.
36
 
 
In the essay “Canadian Development Assistance:  A Profile,” Pratt elaborated: 
From 1977 on, it became increasingly clear that this objective must share primacy 
with and, indeed, often yield to foreign policy and commercial objectives.  The 
argument is not that everything suddenly changed in that year, with humanitarian 
considerations dominating before that date and self-interested national concerns 
afterwards… Nevertheless, 1977 does mark an important disjuncture in the 
history of CIDA… from 1977 on, CIDA’s policies were increasingly integrated 
into overall Canadian foreign policy and into the government’s economic and 
commercial strategies. 
37
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Pratt was concerned with evaluating CIDA’s on-the-ground policies, while putting 
forward the idea that Canadian ODA ought to be humanely internationalist, but that it had not 
necessarily been so in the past.  Those parts of Pratt’s analysis that deal with the details of 
CIDA’s operations before and since 1977 are not relevant to this thesis, which is concerned with 
the RPIW and its formulation of how Canadian foreign policy ought to be articulated and 
implemented.  Yet Pratt’s long-standing criticism of CIDA and Canadian ODA in general 
provides an alternative framework for analyzing Canada’s development policy. 
 In  “Ethics and foreign Policy:  the case of Canada’s development assistance,” written in 
1988, Pratt put forward specific criticisms of the Mulroney government’s response to “For 
Whose Benefit?”, a report issued by the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on External 
Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT).  Referred to as the Winegard Report, this document, 
in Pratt’s estimation, “strongly reaffirmed a humane international approach to development 
assistance.”
38
  He evaluated the government’s response to the Winegard Report in a series of six 
areas, finally concluding that “the government has not been nearly as responsive to humane 
internationalist considerations in regard to development assistance as was the committee,”
39
 who 
in turn were more in step with popular Canadian sentiment on development.  Once again, the 
particulars of Pratt’s analysis are not as relevant to this thesis as his underlying treatment of 
Canadian ODA.  By way of cataloguing his disappointment with the Mulroney government’s 
stance on a humane internationalist development policy, Pratt shares his vision of a more just and 
effective Canadian ODA policy: 
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The implications of the argument in this article are disheartening for those who 
want Canadian policies on development assistance to express fully and 
uncompromisingly the humane internationalism that is a feature of the Canadian 
public philosophy.  They demonstrate that there has been a consistent resistance 
to this aspiration within senior policy-making circles in Canada… Ethical 
considerations have not been totally excluded.  Recurrently a political leader will 
endeavour to secure more ethically responsive policies.  As well, sustained 
pressure by concerned public interest groups can influence policy, especially 
when what they advocate falls within the humane internationalist tradition that is 
part of Canada’s public philosophy.
40
 
 
It is clear that Pratt not only privileges a humane internationalist approach to development, but 
also sees this approach as central to Canadian public philosophy.  It is also clear that he perceives 
a struggle between humane internationalism and the more starkly national interest-driven 
policies of the Mulroney government.  
 In  “Competing rationales for Canadian development assistance,” written in 1999, Pratt 
went on to evaluate Canada in the World in light of his perception of the struggle “between those 
who want to ensure that CIDA is ever more responsive to trade and other foreign policy 
objectives and those, primarily within CIDA, who want to limit the erosion of CIDA's putative 
primary focus on helping the poorest peoples and countries.”
41
    To add to the challenges of 
generating support for his idea of humane internationalism, Pratt found that Canadian popular 
opinion had undergone a fundamental, and troubling, shift: 
…the 1990s have witnessed a profound shift in the dominant values of Canadian 
society. Canadians have become less caring towards their own poor and much 
swifter to blame them for their hardships. Canadian values have moved away 
from the socially responsible and pragmatically interventionist liberalism that had 
for decades been their dominant characteristic. As a society, Canadians, or at least 
their dominant opinion shapers, became increasingly skeptical about the 
efficiency of government interventions to promote equity and justice and 
developed instead a remarkable confidence in the social and economic advantages 
of the unfettered operation of the market, both nationally and internationally.
42
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If the prevailing values of Canadians had shifted away from caring about the poor, and if 
governments continue to be indifferent, could the idea of humane internationalism be said to 
have any relevance to Canadian development policy at all?  This question loomed as Pratt forged 
ahead with his analysis. 
 Pratt went on to criticize the idea that security and prosperity, at a very basic level, 
represented a way of dismissing the unfavoured idea that development ought to be ‘altruistic’ 
while still preserving a development policy in general: 
In discussing development assistance the report [produced by a taskforce 
involving the International Development Research Centre, the International 
Institute for sustainable Development and the North-South Institute] impatiently 
dismisses altruism and concentrates instead on Canada's self-interest. It suggests 
that it is better to act now in many situations of growing poverty in Third World 
countries in order to avoid 'the much greater and more frightening cost of 
providing a remedial response later.' It refers to the goodwill that comes from 
being a good global citizen and it sees foreign aid as increasing Canada's 
competitive position. Finally, in discussing how to explain its recommendations to 
the Canadian public, the report argues that they 'must be related to the ultimate 
product: greater security for Canadians, the environment, and jobs’…  In the 
immediate aftermath of Canada in the World, deploying a rationale for 
development assistance based on its contribution to national security and 
prosperity was defended as tactically shrewd… Realist arguments that effective 
development assistance lessens the threats to Canada's security from widespread 
anarchy, international terrorism, and uncontrollable mass migration, it was 
suggested, were more likely to be persuasive to them than arguments founded on 
considerations of ethics and human solidarity.
43
 
 
Pratt countered that such arguments were no substitute for a policy that was rooted in ethics and 
in humane internationalism: 
Abandoning the language of justice and solidarity in favour of that of Canadian 
security and national interests would mark a significant erosion of our 
fundamental values as a people, a giving up of any championing of that 
component of basic Canadian values that stresses sensitivity towards the basic 
human rights and development needs of the world's poorest.  It would, moreover, 
likely be a retreat to no avail. Relying on arguments of national security is 
unlikely to win more support for generous aid policies for the poorest. Fear of the 
poor is, in one guise or another, at the root of the security case for development 
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assistance as many employ it. However, fear is a vastly less reliable foundation on 
which to construct humanitarian policies than is empathy and justice. Hostility 
and anger rather than generosity or solidarity are more frequently the by-products 
of fear. 
44
 
 
Clearly, Pratt did not believe an interests-driven development policy could have any enduring 
usefulness.  Furthermore, he believed that the sorts of broadly interests-driven policies arising 
from CW would mark a radical departure from basic Canadian values. 
 Can a foreign policy review released by a government fundamentally alter the character 
of development in such a way?  Despite Pratt’s bleak assessment of CW, he did not believe such 
a sea-change would be so simple, nor so complete.  In “Ethical values and Canadian foreign 
policy: two case studies,” written in 2000, he explored CW in more positive terms: 
Nevertheless, [in CW] the humanitarian component within Canada's aid 
programme retained a resilience that is not easily explained in either statist or 
dominant class terms. Even though the aid budget was cut, the humanitarian thrust 
of its official objectives diffused, and its programmes often focused on narrowly 
national economic objectives, the impact of ethical values could still be discerned.  
Substantial amounts of aid still went to very poor countries of little economic or 
political interest to Canada. A major programme continued in Bangladesh, despite 
an effort by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to curtail it 
severely. Meeting the basic needs of the poorest was reaffirmed as a central 
objective of CIDA policies. The NGO community continued to speak out for 
older humane internationalist values.
45
 
 
In other words, even in the face of a policy that explicitly endorsed development as a way of 
ensuring future Canadian security and prosperity, there could be strong variations in foreign and 
development policy outcomes. Even if an ethical, humane internationalist framework should be 
rejected by a government, development policy goals could still reflect ethical values. This, 
coupled with the fact that interested third parties such as NGOs would continue to champion 
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humane internationalist policies, ensured that development and humane internationalism would  
continue to be linked. 
Conclusions 
 This chapter demonstrates two divergent ways of thinking about Canadian foreign policy 
in general, and Canadian development policy in particular.  The works of Stairs, Nossal and 
Welsh represent a synthesis of the interests-values debate into a conception of Canadian foreign 
policy that calls for that policy to be interests-driven yet values-based.  As we will see, this idea 
has been broadly endorsed within RPIW.  By contrast, Pratt evaluates Canadian development 
policy and concludes that it has been confusing, ineffective and potentially unethical.  
 In the chapters ahead, each of these two approaches to Canadian foreign and development 
policy provides a useful lens through which to analyze RPIW.  The above review of the works of 
Stairs, Nossal and Welsh will inform this analysis. The work of Pratt, however, will give 
valuable insight into RPIW’s shortcomings. 
 26 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MARTIN REVIEW IN CONTEXT:  COMPARING RPIW TO ITS PREDECESSORS 
 
In February of 2005, the government of Prime Minister Paul Martin released its much-
anticipated foreign policy review.  Titled A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (RPIW), the 
review set out a framework for understanding Canadian foreign policy that identified four 
distinct foreign policy fields, namely, defence, diplomacy, development and commerce.  The 
review began with a lengthy but useful overview that presented the philosophical underpinnings 
of the policies within these four fields.  
RPIW bears examination in relation to similar Canadian foreign policy reviews that came 
before.  Accordingly, the analysis that follows below includes references to Foreign Policy for 
Canadians (FPC),
1
 published in 1970; the 1985 foreign policy review, Competitiveness and 
Security (CS);
2
 and the 1995 review, Canada in the World (CW).
3
 These earlier reviews form an 
important backdrop for the analysis provided in the thesis because they too discuss interests and 
values, albeit in frameworks that are neither systematic nor analytically helpful in their own  
right.  
Structure 
 The three earlier reviews present broad foreign policy statements in relatively brief 
documents, but the structure of RPIW is quite different.  RPIW is, in fact, a collection of 
documents devoted to the four separate foreign policy fields of defence, diplomacy, development 
and commerce. 
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RPIW begins with an overview, which both serves as an introduction to the four policy 
documents and establishes the philosophical underpinnings of the 2005 review in general.  At 30 
pages, plus an additional five-page cover letter from Prime Minister Paul Martin, RPIW: 
Overview is equal in length to any of the four policy documents, and in the case of the 
documents on commerce and diplomacy, exceeds their length by several pages.   
One of the more striking and immediate features of RPIW: Overview is the long, detailed 
cover letter from the prime minister.  After an initial passage devoted to the need to review 
foreign policy at the time of writing, the letter introduces the foreign policy fields and important 
philosophical ideas that the Martin government wished to underscore as important to the policy 
statements that follow.  
The main section of RPIW: Overview begins by outlining the foreign policy context in 
which Canada must operate, and includes a discussion of Canada’s position as neighbor to the 
US superpower.  In this position, Canada finds itself challenged by both the realities of 
interdependence and the necessity to develop its own foreign policy.  RPIW: Overview takes 
great care to describe the delicate nature of this challenge, with paragraphs outlining new threats 
such as terrorist activity, “global institutions under strain”
4
 and the new global distribution of 
power caused by US unilateralism.  Next, it describes at length the four foreign policy fields of 
defence, diplomacy, development and commerce.  Discussion follows on the challenges of 
stabilizing fragile states, combating proliferation and promoting sustainable development.  
RPIW: Overview ends with a section on the “new multilateralism,” in which the 
government acknowledges the roles of power and rules: both attempt to “harness the capacity of 
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the powerful and transform it into a responsibility for maintaining global peace and security.”
5
  
Canada encourages current and emerging world powers to work towards the establishment of 
“mechanisms for global governance”
6
 such as the G20, with the values-based assumption that “a 
rules-based and more predictable international system produces better results than one that is 
dominated by independent and uncoordinated action.”
7
  
Canada in the world 
It is useful to compare RPIW to the Chrétien government’s 1995 review, CW.  In many 
ways, the newer policy review is an answer to the criticisms of its predecessor made by 
academics as well as the public.  At just over 55 pages,
*
 CW is conspicuously short and contains 
a more generalized treatment of Canadian foreign policy.  It contains no table of contents, and 
presents policy in short, captioned, and heavily bullet-pointed sections.   
CW begins with a five-page executive summary and preface, then an introduction that 
describes the international context in which Canada is situated.  The document  defines Canada’s 
foreign policy objectives as threefold: “the promotion of prosperity and employment; the 
protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian 
values and culture.”
8
  In the three sections that follow, each of these key objectives is outlined in 
broad strokes, bringing together policy vectors (such as trade or diplomacy) and specific issues 
(such as high seas fishing or new financial technologies).  Finally, sections on Canadian Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) policy and institutional imperatives (such as improved 
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parliamentary consultation and new technologies for the foreign service) appear under the 
thematic headings “International Assistance”
9
 and “The Path Ahead.”
10
 
Competitiveness and security 
 Structurally, the 2005 review differs most from the foreign policy review produced by the 
Mulroney government in 1985, titled Competitiveness and Security (CS).  The latter is a brief, 
43-page paper mostly concerned with the international trade issues that dominated Canadian 
political discourse at the time.  After offering a vision of Canada’s “national attributes”
11
 by way 
of introduction, CS addresses almost every aspect of Canada’s foreign policy through the lens of 
trade and international competition. 
CS contains three main sections.  The first, titled “Policy in a Global Context,”
12
 presents 
a brief analysis of the international economic system, including the areas of economic policy 
cooperation, trade, international debt and international development cooperation, followed by a 
corollary section on international politics and security, including collective security, arms 
control, the United Nations and human rights.   
The second section, titled “Canada in the World,”
13
 is dedicated to the idea that Canadian 
prosperity and security are inextricably linked to those of the rest of the world.  By far the most 
philosophical of all the sections in CS, this section approaches these linkages, as always, through 
the lens of trade.  The trade focus is carried over into a discussion of “Power and Influence,” in 
which it is argued that Canada’s international influence is an extension of “both national assets 
and of national will.”
14
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The third section, titled “Directions for Change,”
15
 once again twins international 
economics with politics and security, this time by presenting a sampling of the various policy 
directions the Mulroney government prefers to take in both these areas.  In terms of structure, the 
third section mirrors the first quite closely, providing specific policy prescriptions in roughly the 
same thematic order as the analysis developed in the first section.  
Accompanying the main sections of CS are a series of stand-alone, point-form profiles of 
the various countries and regions with which Canada interacts, including lists of Canada’s 
imports and exports by country and a country-by-country breakdown of Canada’s ODA program.  
In addition to these profiles, CS includes 16 tables and graphs, the majority of which elaborate on 
trade and economic factors such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), import/export imbalances 
and sector-specific productivity growth.  No Canadian government before or since has presented 
such an array of PowerPoint-style visual aids, tables, graphs and bullet-pointed reference articles 
within their reviews of foreign policy.
*
 
Foreign policy for Canadians 
RPIW has the most in common structurally with the six-booklet review produced by the 
Trudeau government in 1970, Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC).  Although nowhere near as 
conscious of government sectors as RPIW, FPC devotes one of its six booklets to international 
development alone, while the remaining five either deal with entire regions, Canada’s dealings 
with the United Nations or the general aims of Canada’s foreign policy as a whole.  In many 
ways, the introductory booklet is similar in scope and purpose to RPIW:  Overview.  Each 
provides an account of the world in which its policy is to be forged, and both are concerned with 
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Canadian interests and their articulation within policy.  Similarly, FPC and RPIW’s respective 
sections on development represent the only two attempts to separate development from the rest 
of Canada’s foreign activities, elaborating on development-related policies in stand-alone 
documents.  In the years between these two reviews, no comparable format is to be found.   
FPC, with its concern to explain the reasons, influences and motivations behind the 
Trudeau government’s new foreign policy, is an attempt to create a framework of understanding 
for Canadians.  When compared with RPIW, it represents a more philosophically rarified 
treatment of the subject.  By contrast, RPIW offers content that is more policy-oriented and less 
concerned with convincing Canadians of the justness of the government’s vision for Canadian 
foreign policy.   
Content 
As we have seen above, RPIW shares striking structural similarities with FPC, the 
Trudeau-era review released in 1970.  Both contain similar introductory overviews concerned 
with the contextual and theoretical underpinnings of the policy that follows.   
 RPIW: Overview,
16
 which includes a foreword by Prime Minister Paul Martin, sets the 
tone for the rest of the review.  Within the first few pages, it is easy to identify both the 
government’s liberal outlook, as well as an early nod to criticisms of past reviews: 
There is no contradiction between Canada doing well and Canada doing good.  
Canada benefits directly when the world is more secure, more prosperous, more 
healthy, and more protective of the natural environment.  If we are to take our 
responsibilities seriously to ourselves and the Canadian generations to follow, 
then we must take our responsibilities to the global community seriously as well, 
not only with noble sentiment and rhetoric - we must also earn and perhaps re-
earn our way.  This will take effort and it will take dedication.
17
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In only a few introductory words, Prime Minister Martin makes two revealing assertions. Firstly, 
he invokes the liberal belief that the security and prosperity of any nation is linked to that of the 
developing world.  Thus, in the world of development assistance, our seemingly altruistic acts 
contribute directly to the future prosperity and security of Canada.  In effect, Martin aims to 
convince Canadians that, feelings of philanthropy aside, it is in our best interests to pursue a 
development assistance program abroad. 
Secondly, he responds to the popular criticism that past Canadian foreign policy has 
substituted values-laden rhetoric for expanded program funding.  Canada, he asserts, can no 
longer afford to rest on its reputation as peacekeeper, international mediator and engaged middle 
power.  From such a powerful statement, it would be easy to assume that substantial changes are 
on the way for Canada’s foreign policy.  Indeed, the letter goes on to outline a policy that “will 
be realistic about Canada’s ability to help others,”
18
 and will accordingly offer a more targeted, 
sectoral approach to development that integrates it with defence and diplomacy efforts in parallel 
areas. 
The foreword from the prime minister contains its own stand-alone section called “The 
New Multilateralism.”
19
  In this section, Martin outlines five areas in which he intends to push 
for international action, citing examples of areas the United Nations had once thought to be 
solely under the authority of individual states.  Many of these areas hold particular significance 
for development, and include both capacity-building and protecting the individual human rights 
of foreign nationals abroad.  This section is best perceived as an extension of the Martin 
government’s liberal orientation, with its emphasis on security and prosperity.  However, 
paragraphs later, Martin is careful to acknowledge the limits of such an enterprise, in part 
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because of the government’s commitment to a more selective, targeted and efficient policy.  As 
critics of past policies have pointed out, committing Canada to multilateralism (or any large, 
values-based idea) as an end in itself would be to commit it to a costly, impossible and possibly 
dangerous enterprise, taking us further away from the results we hope to achieve in the process.  
Although the example in this case is Canada’s involvement with multilateral institutions, it is 
easy to view this argument as a response to general criticisms such as those in Kim Richard 
Nossal’s “‘The World We Want’?” that deal with the flaws inherent in values-driven policy.  It is 
clear that the authors of RPIW were sensitive to past criticisms of articulated foreign policy 
goals. 
A section within RPIW: Overview titled “The Canadian Approach” provides a clear 
statement concerning interests and values: “In charting a path forward, Canada’s interests will 
guide us. They are intimately linked to the character of our society and the values it embodies.”
20
  
Such a strong endorsement of a values-guided, interests-driven approach to Canadian foreign 
policy can only mean that the Martin government accepted criticisms of CW’s use of values as 
goals, and that the policies that came from its review would not fall victim to past mistakes.  
Indeed, the very next paragraph reveals that the Martin government embraced the same set of 
values outlined by Jennifer Welsh in At Home in the World: “Canada’s continued success 
depends on the joint pursuit of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”
21
  Since Welsh 
was consulted extensively by the Martin government during the writing of this policy statement, 
it is not surprising that these values appear as guiding principles.  Welsh had observed that these 
three values are easy to support and almost impossible for any Western country to reject.   
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What follows the first explicit appearance of these values is a familiar treatment of 
Canada’s unique attributes, including a commitment to pluralism and minority rights.  While 
Denis Stairs might be critical of the government’s assertion that “[i]n [sic] no circumstances is 
violence an acceptable means for seeking to effect political change”
22
 in Canada, the picture that 
the Martin government painted of Canada’s unique history and institutions was explicitly linked 
to the three values.  Clearly, it cannot be said that this foreign policy statement left its guiding 
principles undefined. 
But what of Canada’s interests?  There is one definitive statement of Canadian interests 
several paragraphs after the first appearance of the three values: 
Our fundamental interests - ensuring continued prosperity and security for 
Canadians - remain the same as they were in 1995 when we last set a strategic 
course for our international policy.  In fact, these are enduring interests.  But their 
precise articulation must flow from an understanding of who we are today and the 
contemporary context in which we live.
23
  
 
The above passage hints at the universal nature of these interests.  After all, security and 
prosperity are the two conditions a state pursues to ensure its future existence, and their primacy 
in any foreign policy calculation will never be questioned.  This basic truth about the behaviour 
of states is as true today as it was in 1995, even if the policies that result are different.  It is also 
true, of course, that if Canada’s interests are defined at their most basic, universal level, as they 
appear to be in RPIW, and if the precise form of those interests within the policy is always 
subject to contemporary conditions, governments will always have significant leeway when 
deciding how they drive policy. 
 As we have seen, the Martin government in RPIW, in what seems to have been a response 
to past criticisms, chose to introduce policy with an explicit commitment to a set of values and 
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interests.  RPIW’s three values - democracy, the rule of law and human rights—are highly 
accessible and easy to support.   Security and prosperity, the standard definition of Canada’s 
national interests, represent the ultimate goal of any state, and are similarly uncontroversial.  In 
RPIW: Overview, we are told that this conception of values and interests will inform all policies 
in every facet of Canadian foreign policy, and that Canada’s new integrated approach will 
demand a more efficient, streamlined set of policies.   
Accordingly, in each section of RPIW we should find a set of results-driven policies that, 
in their own way, demonstrate both their origin in Canada’s three values and a commitment to 
furthering our basic interests.  Examining the four different and broadly defined foreign policy 
fields - defence, diplomacy, development and commerce - RPIW attempts to present specialized, 
separate accounts of these fields, and also calls for the integration of the operations of the various 
departments that administer them in practice.  As outlined above, these four accounts are 
introduced by a foreword that is both philosophical in scope and concerned with putting the 
policy field in context.  
Competitiveness and security 
Perhaps above all the previous Canadian foreign policy statements, RPIW represents a 
philosophical departure from the Mulroney-era review, Competitiveness and Security (CS),
24
 
Reflecting the dominance of trade issues on Canada’s national agenda, Mulroney’s document 
framed almost every aspect of Canadian foreign policy in terms of Canada’s public and private 
sector trade interests.   
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Its brief section on development shares this preoccupation: 
Canadian understanding of the diversity and complexity of the Third World has 
deepened and become more sophisticated.  So, too, has our appreciation of the 
interests we have at stake.  Trade and investment, immigration, environmental 
conservation and international peace and security have been added to our original, 
largely humanitarian, objectives.  The prospects for pursuing these interests in the 
Third World have become increasingly linked to other key items on the 
international economic agenda—energy, debt and finance, trade and domestic 
industrial change.
25
 
 
Beyond the overwhelming emphasis on economic issues, the above statement has several 
remarkable features.  Firstly, Canadian interests such as trade and security have been explicitly 
linked with the success of Canadian ODA programming.  Secondly, this linkage comes with a 
clear expression of the importance ODA has to Canadian interests in general, beyond its 
“original” humanitarian objectives.  The government appears to be subscribing to the idea that 
interests drive policy, possibly at the expense of the altruistic or humanitarian motives that are 
perceived to be the traditional basis for development policy.  Still, the universal values affirmed 
two decades later by Jennifer Welsh in At Home in the World are observable.  At Home in the 
World’s core Canadian values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law are found in CS in 
subtle ways: 
Structural and political issues are equally important.  Many countries lack the 
appropriate technology, human resources and institutions needed for 
development, and their cultural and political approaches tend to complicate or 
inhibit economic and social development.  There is growing recognition of the 
need for fundamental economic policy change.
26
 
 
Though couched in the language of economic analysis and devoid of explicit prescriptions for 
political, social and economic change, the above statement suggests that countries like Canada 
have, in their own national institutions and values, a better system that developing nations would 
be wise to at least partially adopt.   
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Canada in the world 
RPIW has been contrasted most notably with Canada in the World (CW).  Like any 
expression of foreign policy, CW is explicitly interested in using Canada’s international 
influence “to protect and promote Canada’s values and interests in the world.”
27
  However, its 
three key objectives are anything but values-based and interests-driven: 
In response to Canadians’ aspirations and to meet the challenges of an evolving 
world, the Government will pursue foreign policy to achieve three key objectives: 
The promotion of prosperity and employment; The protection of our security, 
within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and 
culture.
28
 
 
Appearing as the first two key objectives (or “pillars,” as CW calls them) of the review are the 
familiar universal national interests of prosperity and security.  However, instead of informing 
Canadian foreign policy, these values are to be codified and projected abroad as goals unto 
themselves.  CW goes on to list “respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the 
environment”
29
 as the specific values to be projected, along with the export of the Canadian 
education system, cultural diversity and other “cultural products and services.”
30
  The muddled 
policy that results from this confusion of values-as-goals has been explored at length by Denis 
Stairs and Kim Richard Nossal, and while three of the four values listed in CW are the same 
basic Canadian values identified by Welsh, their appearance as policy goals has been vigorously 
criticized.  
 The projection of values abroad has its own dedicated section within CW, and is framed 
as one of foreign policy’s three objectives.  CW posits a direct link between Canadian values and 
Canadian prosperity, and embraces the liberal internationalist idea that “industrialized states … 
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have ethical obligations towards those beyond their borders.”
31
  Accordingly, CW assumes there 
is a clear connection between the security of the world’s most vulnerable citizens and the 
continuing prosperity and security of Canada.  Although this aspect of CW has been criticized, 
some of its statements within certainly resonate with Canadians: 
Canada is not an island: if the rights of people abroad are not protected, 
Canadians will ultimately feel the effects at home.  They understand that our 
economic and security interests are served by the widest possible respect for the 
environment, human rights, participatory government, free markets and the rule of 
law.  Where these are observed, there is a greater prospect of stability and 
prosperity—where they are not, of uncertainty and poverty.  Their observance, 
therefore, is both an end in itself and a means to achieving other priority 
objectives.
32
 
 
From a Canadian point of view, it is hard to disagree with the importance of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.  However, CW asks Canadians to embrace the idea that in order 
to be effective internationally, we must actively spread these values to other independent nation-
states. 
 Nowhere does the idea of values-as-goals become as apparent as in the section on 
development.  In it, international assistance programs are promoted as vital to each of the three 
pillars, and the review outlines a mandate for Canadian aid programming: “to support sustainable 
development in developing countries, in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more 
secure, equitable and prosperous world.”
33
  Aid, according to the Chrétien government, has value 
as an altruistic expression of “Canadians’ desire to help the less fortunate and of their strong 
sense of social justice,”
34
 but also serves as “an effective means of sharing [our] values with the 
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rest of the world.”
35
 
 Within CW, the slim section on development offers few clues about what will drive the 
policy.  Yet within the brief outline of the government’s six program priorities there is ample 
evidence of the confusion between interests and values identified by Stairs and Nossal.  
Alongside fairly clear-cut, self-contained goals, such as the commitment of 25% of Canada’s 
ODA to basic human needs, there are the values-as-goals Stairs and Nossal deride as illiberal and 
impossible: 
Human rights, democracy, good governance: to increase respect for human rights, 
including children’s rights; to promote democracy and better governance; and to 
strengthen both civil society and the security of the individual.
36
 
 
These are the same universal values identified by Welsh, but in this case, they are presented as 
policy goals in and of themselves.   
The Martin government was touted as having solved these problems with the winning 
formula of values-based, interests-driven policy.  However sound the thinking may be behind 
this approach, the idea is hardly revolutionary.  The same hierarchy of interests and values can be 
found in Foreign Policy for Canadians (FPC), a statement published 35 years and three foreign 
policy reviews ago. 
 Foreign policy for Canadians 
Designed as a citizen’s primer on Canada’s foreign policy, FPC reads as a more 
philosophical policy review than RPIW, which, with the exception of RPIW: Overview, is 
concerned predominantly with the individual aspects of policy implementation and outcomes.  
However, deeper philosophical similarities are revealed when one look closely at the two 
reviews placed side by side.  
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 Like all of the policy iterations that came after it, FPC operates under the liberal 
internationalist understanding that the prosperity and security of other nations and their citizens 
is connected to those of Canada.  In the review’s free-standing section on development, Canada’s 
motivations for maintaining a development policy are expressed through the idea that Canadians 
are a people who acknowledge the importance of the well-being of the individual person: 
One basic value of Canadian society is the importance of the individual person, 
and of his rights and welfare … [T]his ethic was adopted and translated into the 
legal and political systems which Canada has inherited.  Those systems, imperfect 
though they may be in practice, are based on the tenet that all individuals in a 
society have both rights and obligations toward other citizens in that society, 
because the potential of that society cannot be realized unless the potential of each 
of its members is also realized. It is the basic assumption on which a democratic 
system rests.
37
 
 
The above statement nicely captures the Trudeau government’s commitment to human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law as the motivations behind the policy in general.  However, as we 
see a few paragraphs later, interests have an equal role as motivators: 
We could not expect to find the same sympathy for Canadian interest or support 
for Canadian policies amongst the other nations with which we are associated in 
the world community if we were unwilling to bear our share of our collective 
responsibilities … Assistance to the less-developed nations serves Canada’s 
interest in some other and more immediate respects.  It is an important and 
integral part of the general conduct of Canada’s external relations, particularly 
with the developing countries … Successful economic development in the less-
advanced countries will assist in the expansion of world trade as a whole and 
provide a growing market for Canadian goods and services.
38
 
 
Not only do Canada’s interests lie in the abstract idea of interdependent security and prosperity, 
but also in a series of more immediate benefits.   
Like FPC, RPIW makes the connection between security and prosperity abroad and at 
home, as well as the connection between international development and domestic policy.  
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However, RPIW provides a more specific outline of the liberal internationalist vision.  The 
authors clearly want their readers to start thinking about development policy as an important 
preventative arm of the security policies that one would typically associate with defence and 
diplomacy.  But in the next paragraph, they also see commercial benefits: 
 [W]hile the primary responsibility for achieving growth and equitable 
development lies with developing counties themselves, industrialized countries 
such as Canada have a responsibility not only to increase the flow of development 
aid, but also to help expand economic opportunities for developing countries … 
Canada can build on its international experience in supporting development that is 
sustainable in economic, social and environmental terms.
39
 
 
In a few short paragraphs, the government has tied the security and economic facets of foreign 
policy to development, demonstrating the interconnectivity among their various departments.  As 
we have seen, the idea that these aspects of Canada’s involvement in the world are 
interconnected is not new, but their formal fusion in a foreign policy statement is an innovation. 
 In fact, the wealth of specific policy pronouncements in RPIW represents a departure 
from past policy statements, including the philosophically similar FPC.  The five general policy 
goals of RPIW, outlined above in the section on structure, stand in marked contrast to those 
offered in FPC.  In fact, no similar articulation of goals is present in FPC at all.  FPC’S section 
on development, besides its expressed commitment to the Canadian national interest, offers little 
in the way of development policy specifics. 
 But what of the role of interests and values in the Trudeau review’s policy creation 
process?  By way of refuting past preoccupations with influence and international prestige, the 
authors of FPC explain: 
In undertaking this review the Government has been constantly reminded of its 
need and responsibility to choose carefully aims, objectives and priorities in 
sufficiently long and broad terms to ensure that essential Canadian interests and 
values are safeguarded in a world situation where rapid and even radical changes 
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can be anticipated as normal rather than exceptional conditions.  Canada, like 
other states, must act according to how it perceives its aims and interest … In 
essence, foreign policy is the product of the Government’s progressive definition 
and pursuit of national aims and interests in the international environment.  It is 
the extension abroad of national policies.”
40
 
 
Although weight is given earlier in the review to the idea of an international moral imperative, 
FPC makes it clear that development policy, like all branches of foreign policy, is best viewed as 
an extension of the national interest.  FPC presents three ideas, characterized as “national 
aims,”
41
 it believes will best lead to the development of policies that serve the national interest: 
• Canada must be secure, and continue as an independent political entity; 
• Canada and Canadians must enjoy increasing prosperity along the broadest 
possible terms; and 
• Canadians “will see in the life they have and the contribution they make to 
humanity something worthwhile preserving in identity and purpose.”
42
 
 
FPC’s national aims represent a characterization of national interest at its most basic level, 
presenting a vision that builds first on security, then prosperity (or future security), then a sense 
of altruistic purpose designed to provide a reason for the continued existence of Canada as a 
political entity.  With these ideas as a guide, the review proposes that practical, interests-driven 
policy will result. 
Within RPIW, the expression of interests is even more basic.  Simply put, Canada’s 
interest in development lies in the security it brings within and among nations: 
Canadians, who come from every corner of the globe, understand that the life we 
enjoy in Canada depends increasingly on helping to make the world a better place.  
Our future is intertwined with that of people around the globe struggling to secure 
democracy and human rights, to build effective and accountable governance, to 
improve standards of living, and to sustainably manage their environment.  
Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world, or healthy in a sick world; nor can 
we expect to remain prosperous in a poor world.  Failure to achieve significant 
political, economic, social and environmental progress in the developing world 
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will have an impact on Canada in terms of both our long-term security and our 
prosperity.
43
 
 
Although it is a relatively remote and abstract notion, this perceived connection between 
Canadian society and society in the developing world represents the link between Canadian 
interests and the importance of development policy in RPIW. 
FPC includes many explicit expressions of how national interests must drive policy.  It 
also includes a bundle of values that can be said to inform them, a values package that is implicit 
and always present.  Included in Trudeau’s conception of national aims are “preoccupations”
44
 of 
contemporary Canadians, including national sovereignty, unity and security, personal freedom 
and parliamentary democracy, multicultural expression, economic growth, human values and 
humanitarian aspirations.
45
  These preoccupations include interests such as economic growth and 
sovereignty, but running unmistakably through the list are basic values identified by Welsh, 
including human rights and the rule of law (FPC’s “personal freedom”), democracy and the rule 
of law (FPC’s “parliamentary democracy”), and human rights and democracy (FPC’s 
“humanitarian aspirations”).   
With ever-present basic values and a clear role for national interests as policy drivers, 
FPC appears to be the fulfillment of Welsh’s vision for Canadian foreign policy.  The goal of 
Canadian foreign policy is said to be furthering these interests and values:   
“Much of Canada’s effort internationally will be directed to bringing about the 
kinds of situation[s], development, and relationship[s] which will be most 
favourable to the furtherance of Canadian interests and values … Canada’s 
foreign policy, like all national policy, derives its content and validity from the 
degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic aims.”
46
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It is clear, then, that the Martin government was not the first Canadian government to 
support an interests-driven, values-based approach.  Nevertheless, RPIW seems to be more aware 
than its predecessors of its own philosophical underpinnings. We need look no further than 
RPIW: Overview to discover those underpinnings in explicit terms.  It follows, therefore, that we 
should expect to see the same approach in each of the stand-alone documents that make up 
RPIW.   
 
 45 
CHAPTER 4 
INTERESTS AND VALUES IN RPIW: OVERVIEW AND RPIW: DEVELOPMENT 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in RPIW: Overview the Martin government offered an 
explicit endorsement
1
 of the interests-driven, values-based conception of foreign policy 
championed by Jennifer Welsh in At Home in the World.  In particular, RPIW: Overview 
embraces the primacy of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as the guiding values on 
which Canada’s foreign policy must be based.  The interests to be pursued throughout RPIW are 
security and prosperity, which Welsh posits as the two most basic aims of a nation-state.   
Development has been the one feature of Canadian foreign policy that has consistently 
been viewed as a values-based exercise, although interests have never been dismissed entirely.  
The paragraphs below will explore the articulation of the interests-driven, values-based approach 
in RPIW: Development.  We will begin by outlining the structure and content of RPIW: 
Development, the stand-alone document that, together with RPIW: Overview, RPIW: Defence, 
RPIW: International Commerce and RPIW: Diplomacy, make up the 2005 foreign policy review.  
Next, we will examine the treatment of the values-interests dichotomy found in RPIW: 
Development in relation to its treatment in RPIW: Overview, in which the dichotomy is spelled 
out explicitly.  Two observations will emerge from this analysis. First of all, it will be clear that 
the treatment of interests and values does not match the interests-driven, values-based approach 
promoted by Welsh and adopted RPIW: Overview. Secondly, it will be clear that values are 
observable in RPIW: Development, but that interests, even in as broad a sense as they are 
presented by Welsh, are much harder to see. The reason for the latter, we will argue, is that while 
the implementation of Canadian development policy does not necessarily reflect altruism, 
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development is by its very nature an altruistic exercise and thus cannot be driven by interests.  In 
the case of development, foreign policy goals can be defined in terms of values, after all.  
Development: Structure 
 Within RPIW: Development, the government presents a nine-part account of Canada’s 
commitment to international development, which is prefaced by a cover letter from Minister of 
International Cooperation Aileen Carroll.  Like the Mulroney-era document, Competitiveness 
and Security (CS), RPIW: Development reads like an executive summary, and makes use of text 
boxes, graphs, bullet points and illustrations in order to present development policy ideas to the 
reader.  The nine parts vary significantly in length, level of detail and style of prose, appearing as 
anything from 10 organized, detailed pages to a single fragmented, point-form page.   
At 31 pages, RPIW: Development is equal in length to RPIW: Overview, and is organized 
in much the same way.  Both documents begin with an analysis of the challenges facing Canada, 
followed by an introduction to the policies and principles developed to  address them.  The first 
part of RPIW: Development is titled “A World in Transition,” and is concerned with 
summarizing the current state of development in the world, including both the progress that has 
been made and the trends that continue to create problems.  These trends are listed and 
summarized, and include uneven development, weak governance, health crises, lack of access to 
education, demographic pressure, gender inequality and environmental stress.
2
  This list is 
followed by a summary of the steps that will be taken to address these challenges.  The steps are 
discussed under the subheadings “A global partnership for development,”
3
 “An integrated 
national approach to development”
4
 and “Enhancing aid effectiveness.”
5
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 In the second part of RPIW: Development, titled “The Way Forward,” the finer details of 
the steps cited above are expanded in a bullet-pointed, executive summary-style page composed 
of a mix of governing principles, specific government initiatives and detailed spending 
commitments.  A three-page third part titled “A Whole-of-Government Approach to 
Development” fleshes out a new commitment to policy coherence that is described later in the 
document. 
 The fourth part of RPIW: Development, titled “A More Strategic Focus,” is the longest 
and fullest.  It is divided into two sections, each devoted to defining a particular way in which the 
government will “[strengthen] the impact and effectiveness of development cooperation.”
6
  The 
first section affirms Canada’s commitment to greater focus on sectors, which include “five 
programming sectors and one crosscutting theme.”
7
  In this case, the five programming sectors 
are good governance, improved health outcomes, basic education, private sector development 
and environmental sustainability.  The crosscutting theme, which is pervasive throughout the 
document, is gender equality. The second section of “A More Strategic Focus” commits 
Canadian aid to a more focused country concentration, and outlines how this new, streamlined 
list of donor countries will be selected.   
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The selected countries will fall into five categories: 
1) Development partners
8
 - Countries in this category will receive two-thirds of 
available bilateral resources; 
2) Other ongoing bilateral relationships
9
 - Countries in this category will receive one-
third of available bilateral resources; 
3) Failed and fragile states
10
 - These countries share portions of the one-third above; 
4) Graduating middle-income countries
11
 – Funding will wind down over time; and 
5) Other ODA-eligible countries – Funding will wind down, but further assistance will 
be “available through other channels.”
12
 
 
After presenting this vision of how Canada’s development programs will be run, the fifth 
part of RPIW: Development, “Working with Multilateral Institutions,” commits Canada to the 
principles behind a multilateral framework, including the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).  The MDGs, a set of time-constricted goals and targets agreed upon by developed and 
developing nations in 2000, serve as the standard against which the Martin government will 
measure Canada’s development program progress.  Intended to be met by 2015, the targets cover 
eight basic elements of human development: 
1) Halving extreme poverty and hunger; 
2) Achieving universal primary education; 
3) Promoting gender equality; 
4) Reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds; 
5) Reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters; 
6) Reversing the spread of HIV/ADS, malaria and TB; 
7) Ensuring environmental sustainability; and 
8) Developing a global partnership for development, with targets for aid.
13
 
 
Multilateralism allows Canada to “remain engaged in countries without a full-scale bilateral 
program.”
14
  The MDGs will “provide the best prospects for an inclusive process to set the rules 
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of international conduct and a forum to promote values important to Canada, including 
democracy, human development and social justice.”
15
  In other words, the authors of this 
document see multilateral action and the MDGs as the best and most efficient way of promoting 
Canadian values and interests. 
The next two pages, which make up the sixth part of RPIW: Development, titled 
“Engaging Canadians in Development,” put forward ideas for involving Canadian citizens in 
overseas development, including the continuation of the Canada Corps program and connecting 
more of civil society with NGOs, businesses, cooperatives and other organizations with projects 
overseas.  A seventh, one-page part of RPIW: Development, titled “Leading-Edge Delivery 
System,” expounds on aid efficiency and organized delivery systems, and affirms Canada’s 
commitment to transparency, accountability, results-based development and other management 
principles.
16
   
Development: Content 
RPIW: Development begins with an outline of the international context in which 
Canada’s development policy is to be created, and ends with an account of the practical aspects 
of service delivery.  The introduction to RPIW: Development serves to reiterate the government’s 
commitment to the interests and values set out in RPIW: Overview, adding that they intend to 
adopt a whole-of-government approach to development.  Accordingly, the five general goals of 
the policy are as follows: 
1) To advance Canada’s chosen values (global citizenship, equity and environmental 
sustainability) and interests (security, prosperity and governance) abroad; 
2) To deliver results according to the MDGs; 
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3) To match Canadian niches with the needs of recipient states; 
4) To recognize and address linkages among environmental degradation, poverty and 
social inequity; and 
5) To mobilize Canadians to both dialogue on and participation in Canada’s 
development strategy.
17
 
 
Some of the implications that these stated policy goals have for the articulation of values and 
interests will be brought into focus below.  However, for the purpose of understanding the 
structure of RPIW: Development, the above five points are best seen as common thematic threads 
that run throughout all of its sections. 
 The first of the five policy goals is clear, and reiterates the government’s commitment to 
the values and interests that appear in RPIW: Overview.  The second, an explicit commitment to 
the MDGs, includes an implicit endorsement of multilateralism, which is identified later in the 
document as central to delivering values and interests.  The third goal deals with service delivery 
at a practical level.  Up to this point, the policy goals stated in RPIW: Development seem to 
complement each other and work towards a cohesive policy framework.  However, the final two 
goals, as we shall see below, are less helpful in defining the policy. 
  After introducing the policy goals, RPIW: Development turns its attention to 
characterizing the negative and positive global trends in development.  We are introduced to the 
MDGs and their role in attempting to generate “an unprecedented international consensus on the 
key problems [of development] and what must be done about them.”
18
  By signalling Canada’s 
intent to work towards the MDGs with most other developed and developing nations, RPIW: 
Development commits Canada to a decidedly multilateralist approach. 
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The Values-Interests Debate 
 In RPIW: Overview, we observe a clear distinction within the values-interests dichotomy: 
Canada’s foreign policy ought to be values-based and interest-driven.  Those values must be the 
core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  The interests pursued must be 
security and prosperity, the two most basic aims of a state.  The question is, does the dichotomy 
work for international development?  The answer appears to be no. 
From the very beginning of RPIW: Development, the authors demonstrate their 
commitment to building on the principles set out in RPIW: Overview while making the link 
between development and Canada’s long-term security and prosperity.  Much like Martin’s letter 
in RPIW: Overview, RPIW: Development attempts to move past altruism, tying development 
activities to state security: 
While there is a moral imperative to respond to the humanitarian crises that erupt 
when states degenerate into conflict and chaos, Canadian interests are better 
served if these can be prevented.  This preventative action can take many forms.  
One of these is long-term development assistance.  This assistance helps build 
public institutions, civil society and accountable political culture, without which 
peace, security, and development cannot be sustained.
19
 
 
We are to think of development as not only tied to other foreign policy objectives, but also the 
basis of Canada’s security policy.  However, the document does not contend that the link 
between development and state interests is the only valid way of looking at development policy: 
Canada’s role in development cooperation cannot be defined exclusively on the 
basis of self-interest.  The needs of our development partners, first and foremost 
in the poorest countries, must be our starting point.  Further, the generosity of 
Canadians, expressed so tangibly in the outpouring of contributions from 
Canadian individuals, organizations, communities and businesses … is one aspect 
of the sense of global citizenship in the Canada of the 21
st
 century.
20
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Even if we acknowledge the value of development policy in the pursuit of Canadian security and 
prosperity, there is clearly an aspect of development that remains somewhat selfless.  Whether it 
is in the perceptions of Canadians who contribute to international relief efforts or in the 
perceived needs of recipient states, the motivations behind many aspects of development cannot 
be perceived as mere extensions of pure self-interest.  Even if we accept a longer view of 
Canadian interests—that these relatively selfless acts will, in time, contribute to a more stable 
world and thus future Canadian security and prosperity - the basic motivation is still altruism. 
 Curiously, an explicit statement of the three Canadian values identified in RPIW: 
Overview - democracy, human rights and the rule of law - does not make an appearance in 
RPIW: Development.  Instead, the document sets out five general goals for development.
21
  Of 
these five general goals, the first two are clear departures from the values-based, interests-driven 
approach endorsed in RPIW: Overview. 
The first goal is to “advance Canadian values of global citizenship, equity and 
environmental sustainability, as well as Canadian interests regarding security, prosperity and 
governance.”
22
  This goal ought to give us pause, as it seems to call for the promotion of both 
Canadian interests and values, an enterprise Nossal and others would deem illiberal and 
inefficient.  It would be even more illiberal and inefficient were the interests of security and 
prosperity perceived as being based on the cited values themselves. The policy would then 
clearly be calling for the active promotion of certain values abroad –– irrespective of whether 
most Canadians agree that such values have merit.   
 Nevertheless, the language of one small introductory paragraph in RPIW: Development 
may not introduce the entire policy framework to the same pitfalls as previous foreign policy 
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articulations.  In fact, it is doubtful that concepts like global citizenship or environmental 
stability could be called values at all, in the sense that Welsh explores in At Home in the World.  
While the concepts are certainly ones most Canadians would rate as positive, most do not 
approach democracy, human rights and the rule of law as principles having universal application.  
Global citizenship, for example, could be characterized as a very specific expression of 
democracy, but it is an outgrowth of democracy nonetheless.  At this point in the document, it 
remains to be seen whether or not the government is choosing to allow values to drive policy in 
place of interests. 
 Perhaps a more comprehensive picture of the Martin government’s intentions for 
development can be found in the part of Development titled “A More Strategic Focus.”
23
  
Although RPIW: Development includes specific sections on citizen engagement, aid delivery 
systems and multilateralism, this section explains exactly what RPIW: Development considers to 
be critical to development in general, and its own development policy in particular.  It provides 
the bulk of the actual policy goals included in RPIW: Development, and outlines, by sector, those 
aspects of a society the government believes are important.  Thus, in theory, this section provides 
the best place to find examples of values-based, interests-driven policy in action. 
The second general goal in RPIW: Development is to “deliver visible, durable impact on 
the world’s key development challenges as identified in the Millennium Development Goals.”
24
  
In the section devoted to this goal, the document once again expresses Canada’s commitment to 
increasing aid effectiveness, in this case by concentrating programming in five sectors they see 
as working towards the MDGs.  In order of appearance, those sectors are good governance, 
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health, basic education, private sector development, and environmental sustainability.
25
  Gender 
equality, while not included in this list, is given a greater place of importance as a crosscutting 
theme that will be a part of the policy surrounding all five sectors.   
If Canada’s interests are security and prosperity, and if the development of the world’s 
poorest countries is critical to realizing these interests in the long-term, then these sectors fit with 
Canada’s interests so long as the aid is effective and the goals of the programs are realized.  In 
terms of values, each of these sectors ties in with at least one of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law.  Specifically, health and basic education both clearly fit under human rights, and 
both could also be said to affect the health of democracy in a state.  After all, without healthy, 
educated citizens, active participation becomes impossible.  Private sector development is more 
ambiguous, but fits with Canadian conceptions of democracy, since a vibrant economy is critical 
to the health of any (liberal) democracy.  Environmental stability sounds more ambiguous still at 
first blush, but the effect that factors such as climate change, land degradation and ground water 
salination have on the overall economic, social and political health of any community—not to 
mention the potential direct consequences for other states, including Canada—is such that 
environmental sustainability fits in with all three values. 
However, in terms of problematic implications for the values-based, interests-driven 
approach in RPIW: Overview, the most interesting sector identified is good governance.   
Good Governance 
Good governance, besides having clear linkages to each of the values, expresses the 
Martin government’s philosophy of development, since the idea of good governance effectively 
deals with the health and progress of entire societies.  Furthermore, the document sees Canada 
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and Canadians as having a special capacity for supporting developing countries’ progressions 
towards good governance: 
Canada’s commitment to tolerance and multiculturalism, to a federal system that 
accommodates diversity, to strong public institutions and to a vibrant civil 
society, makes Canadians well suited to supporting developing countries’ efforts 
to improve their governance … Canada corps will mobilize Canadians to promote 
good governance on two substantive levels.  The first is at the level of statehood -
such as governments, courts, and elections. The second involves those institutions 
that underpin any successful society - systems for health, education, justice, social 
development and environmental sustainability.
26
 
 
The above passage is revealing.  Besides the initial statements about Canada’s special capacity 
for tolerance, diversity and multiculturalism—which many critics of past policies might find 
uncomfortably close to the presumptive arrogance of past conceptions of values
27
—notice that 
those areas where Canadians are suited to deliver aid include three of the four other sectors for 
whole-of-government development.  Health, education and environmental sustainability, which 
each merit their own sections on pages 12, 14 and 18, respectively, are each thought of as part of 
good governance, and appear first in the section titled “Promoting Good Governance.”
28
   
 The idea that good governance is the key to effective development receives further 
support in the choice of five pillars around which the government intends to provide governance 
programming.  The five main pillars are as follows:  
1) Democratization; 
2) Human rights; 
3) The rule of law; 
4) Public sector institution and capacity building; and 
5) Conflict prevention, peace building and security-sector reform.
29
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It should be of immediate interest that the first three pillars are the values that are supposed to 
underpin all foreign policy creation, and that the last aims to enhance the security of developing 
countries, which, as we have seen, the government contends is critical to our own long-term 
security and prosperity. 
 At this point, a problem looms.  It should be obvious that, instead of merely providing the 
core from which interests-driven policy originates, all three of Canada’s core values appear not 
only as policy drivers, but also as policy goals in and of themselves.  This might not be 
immediately obvious, since the five pillars are introduced as the architecture around which 
programming is built, which would still constitute values-based, interests-driven policy so long 
as the programs are effective.  And in this case, it could be argued that values-as-policy-drivers 
might still lead to effective policy, if it were clear that the promotion of those values were critical 
to effective development. 
 While it is true that the role of values in this case, especially when paired with such a 
broad set of interests that are to drive policies, might go beyond what is envisioned by Nossal 
and Welsh, it does not immediately follow that such a role would lead to ineffective policy.  
Furthermore, as policy drivers go, most of the values seem relatively self-contained if we 
understand them as offers we extend to developing countries who, as pledged under the 
Monterrey Consensus,
30
 are interested in taking ownership of their development policies.  Under 
democratization, we pledge to help recipient states to “[strengthen] democratic institutions and 
practices,” but we intend that to mean that we will provide any capacity-building assistance a 
recipient state is willing to accept.  It is not necessarily our version of democracy that will 
constitute the end result.  Similarly, under rule of law, we intend to “support legal/judicial reform 
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with a focus on institutions,”
31
 but beyond the fact that we assert that all states ought to have a 
legal system in the first place - and we would be hard-pressed to find any society on earth with 
no enforced code of conduct whatsoever - our intervention is again limited to what recipient 
states are willing to accept. 
 If the involvement of values as policy drivers were to end there, it would still be possible 
to defend the policies in RPIW in the face of criticisms such as those put forward by Stairs, 
Nossal and Welsh.  However, the role of values clearly goes beyond that of self-contained 
policy-driver when we explore the role of human rights in RPIW: Development.  Although 
pervasive throughout the document like the other two values, the places where respect for human 
rights affects policy tend to have far more interventionist implications.  Canada pledges that 
Future programming will include support for the promotion and implementation 
of human rights, including the rights of women and of children, particularly those 
affected by conflict, gender-based violence and natural disasters.
32
 
 
On the surface, this pledge appears no different from the others.  However, the concept of 
universal human rights is unique in that it is considerably more difficult to base policy on its 
requirements without the result betraying the kind of interventionism rejected by many critics as 
illiberal.  While it can be said that some form of the rule of law is a precondition for human 
civilization, and that democracy in one of its many manifestations is alien to very few cultures, 
the type of universal human rights envisioned by the authors of this document is somewhat less 
likely to be universal among states.  This is not to argue that the idea of universal human rights is 
wrong, or that there are cultures in the world that do not have the capacity for a good human 
rights record.  Widely adopted expressions of support for universal human rights, including the 
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United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
33
 belie such an assertion.  However, if 
we are obligated to all women all over the world, we are susceptible to the sorts of illiberal, 
nebulous, far-reaching and expensive interventions Nossal warns us against.  It would also 
undercut the targeted, goal-oriented approach the Martin government seems to favour in RPIW: 
Overview.  The fact that RPIW: Development espouses a position with the potential to have such 
broad, interventionist policy implications should be troubling to those who support a values-
based, interests-driven approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS:  IS DEVELOPMENT DIFFERENT? 
 
 It is clear that the Martin government’s approach to development, as outlined in RPIW: 
Development, does not reflect the values-based, interests-driven approach set out in RPIW: 
Overview.  As always, the core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are easy to 
see throughout RPIW: Development, but in sections like “Good Governance” they appear as 
policy drivers in place of the basic interests of security and prosperity outlined by Welsh.   
 Do these observations necessarily mean that RPIW: Development fails to address the past 
criticisms of Stairs, Nossal and others?  Perhaps those criticisms miss the mark entirely when it 
comes to development.  If the world’s problems are shared by all nations, as Welsh seems to 
suggest throughout At Home in the World, values and interests will start to merge, and states like 
Canada will begin to acknowledge that an intervention in the form of development aid is by its 
very nature an altruistic, interventionist enterprise.  In other words, maybe development is 
different. 
 This determination runs contrary to the arguments and prescriptions of Kim Richard 
Nossal and, to a lesser extent, Jennifer Welsh.  As we have seen in chapter two, Nossal believes 
effective foreign policy must be driven by state interests.  When he turns his attention to CW in 
“‘The World We Want’?  The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals and Interests in Canadian 
Foreign Policy,” he allows that development will be values-based, but emphasizes that no 
effective aid policy can come from the use of values as policy drivers.  Similarly, Welsh calls for 
a reexamination of the role both values and interests play in foreign policy formation, although 
she ultimately, and perhaps weakly, concludes that a mix of interests and values will inform 
policy not as a projection of values abroad, but as a way of leading by example as a “model 
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citizen”; either way, this view suggests that Canada ought to be interested in creating a world 
that looks more like itself. 
 In RPIW: Overview, the Martin government articulates a clear understanding of this mix 
of interests and values; it seems clear that interests will drive our foreign policy, but that values 
will inform it.  However, as we have seen, this clear articulation does not appear in RPIW: 
Development.  How is it that a document ostensibly written with an interests-driven, values-
based approach in mind manages to generate the same kinds of interventionist development 
policies it seeks to reform? 
Perhaps development has, and always will, be based on an inalienable, altruistic element 
of human nature.  Although the argument is one he ultimately rejects, Joseph Cropsey captures 
this idea in “The Right of Foreign Aid.”
1
  In this essay, Cropsey attempts to answer the difficult 
question of whether wealthy nations have a moral duty to extend help to less-developed countries 
in the form of foreign aid.  Within the first two paragraphs of the essay, he asserts that he will 
separate duty from interest, observing that “…mere duty and interest, as different as another’s 
benefit is from one’s own, can easily conflict.”
2
  While he is not recognizing a values-interests 
dichotomy (as other authors discussed in this thesis have done), his observation reveals his 
endorsement of the idea that the interests of donor and recipient countries may be mutually 
exclusive.  He goes on to explain that 
We can never rest easy, nor be united in our policies, if the suspicion exists that 
what we do for others we do out of duty but against our interest.  Moreover, not 
all men will be satisfied with policies that aim at our advantage but which appear 
at the same time to violate a duty to benefit other human beings.  Because of the 
possibility that duty and interest will conflict, the grounds of each must be 
investigated in light of the distinction.
3
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Cropsey’s investigation follows in four parts.  First, he explores the idea that the motivation 
behind aid-giving is found in a sense of compassion for the less fortunate.  After a few 
paragraphs of analysis, he rejects this idea, stating that “bare sympathy or fellow-feeling is an 
imperfect guide to obligation”
4
 and further that “[r]eason must arbitrate among the sentiments, or 
else actions become arbitrary.”
5
  Ultimately, “[a] man at the other end of the world cannot and 
ought not to presume to claim what a parent, a brother, or a child might reasonably expect… [A] 
duty of universal charity would be to enslave the rational and industrious to the rest.”
6
 
Cropsey moves on to a second question, namely whether the modern scientific project 
extends an obligation from advanced nations to the problems of developing countries.  He argues 
that “the highest task of man, of mankind as a whole, is to establish its intellectual and technical 
supremacy in the world by conquering nature.”  Instead of the unity of mankind being rooted in 
sentiment, the common thread would be our status as the top species in nature.  However, for 
similar reasons to his rejection of sentiment, Cropsey dismisses the duty of the more 
scientifically advanced to the less.  He writes that 
Duty as moral obligation is a bond upon those for whim there exists an “other” 
that matters.  Why does the “other” matter?  … if science means the conquest of 
nature, and knowledge is the power of conquering nature, then the possession of 
scientific knowledge as such carries with it no duty to improve man’s condition 
but only a possibility of doing so.  Their possession of science does not impose a 
duty upon the advanced nations to assist others.
7
 
 
In this passage, we begin to see that Cropsey draws a clear line between duty, which he 
consistently finds to be lacking in humans by nature, and interests, which are the true motivators 
of aid-giving.   
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 Third, Cropsey turns his attention to whether or not democratic principles dictate a duty 
towards developing nations.  This section comes closest to addressing the values-based way of 
thinking about foreign policy, as Cropsey explores whether there is “something in the nature of 
democracy that imposes a duty of universal beneficence upon a democratic nation.”
8
  This is, at 
its outset, a very expansive way of stating the problem.  Cropsey does not allow for the 
possibility that democratic societies may be responsible in certain situations, or in specific, but 
limited, ways.  For him, the question is whether or not democratic nations have a duty to all 
disadvantaged people all of the time.  As with the two preceding questions, Cropsey finds this 
idea to be extremely problematic, as “[i]n order to make it possible for us to act toward all men 
as if our universal principle were in force or had authority among all men, it would be necessary 
for us to extend our rule over all men or at least to propagate democracy among them 
universally.”
9
  
 This criticism should sound familiar.  When the Chrétien government called for the 
promotion of democracy abroad in CW, Nossal condemned the idea as illiberal, potentially costly 
and dangerous.  However, Cropsey’s characterization assumes that, in a world in which nations 
act according to very different principles, a democratic nation would have to act towards others 
as if democracy were in force everywhere.  For Cropsey, it seems it would not be possible for a 
development policy to merely be rooted in democratic principles, without attention being paid to 
ensuring that other countries become democratized. 
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After addressing these questions, Cropsey elegantly articulates the opposing view when he writes 
that the following: 
As citizens in a wealthy nation, we learn something from the contempt in which 
men of means are held who take no pity on the worthy poor that come in their 
way… how can we exculpate those who surfeit themselves, while under their feet 
the children of poverty learn the way of brutes in the school of starvation?... 
Apparently there is a law of our nature that bids us relieve the sufferings of all 
things able to suffer, and certainly of our fellow-men wherever they may be.  We 
appear to incline toward a universal charity.
10
 
 
In other words, humans are motivated to act charitably by their reason. But there is another view, 
put forward by Cranford Pratt, that human motivations may be traced to altruistic impulses. In  
“Competing rationales for Canadian development assistance,” he explains why this must be 
acknowledged:  
Had humane internationalist motivations been entirely swamped by trade and 
national security considerations, Bangladesh would not still receive substantial 
quantities of Canadian bilateral aid; more than 40 per cent of Canadian bilateral 
aid would not still go to Africa; emphasis would not still be placed on meeting 
basic human needs; and there would not be within CIDA today a significant effort 
to ensure that poverty reduction is the common element in all of CIDA's policies 
and programmes.
11
  
 
Even in the case of an overtly interest-driven policy document like CS, the declarative policy and 
the implementation imply that values matter. Is this an accident, or is it evidence that, try as a 
government might, there is no way to avoid development’s essentially altruistic nature? 
It is easy to see that Canada has, over the last 35 years, consistently generated altruistic 
and interventionist development policies.  If we accept the evidence and arguments of Pratt and 
others, this is because we sense a universality across humankind that brings with it a sense of 
obligation to the citizens of nations less fortunate than our own.  Whether this means that Canada 
should be including among its  foreign policy policy goals the propogation of  democracy 
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universally remains a question. RPIW: Development does propose after all that the promotion of 
good governance (no doubt, as in democracy) should be a foreign policy goal for Canada.  
 It is clear that development does not fit with the interests-driven, values-based framework 
put forward in RPIW: Overview.  However, it is also clear that, if they continue to be written as 
they have for the last 39 years, Canadian development policies will continue to be susceptible to 
compelling criticisms of their effectiveness.  It follows that, if any progress can be made in 
incorporating these criticisms, it is up to future Canadian governments - and Canadians in 
general - to undertake a serious examination of the reason for, and goals of, Canadian ODA.   
It has been argued with some persuasiveness that Canadian development assistance does 
not reflect altruism at all.  In his 2006 work on the subject, The White Man’s Burden, William 
Easterly wrote that if Western nations were sincere about effecting change in the developing 
world, Western democracies would not structure their aid programs into the sprawling 
bureaucracies. Easterly observes: 
Rich-country politicians control the foreign aid agencies.  To make the 
relationship between rich-country politicians and aid bureaucracies more precise, 
think of principals and agents… Think of the rich-country politician as the 
principal and the aid bureaucrat as the agent... Voters in the rich country and their 
representatives are the ones who choose the actions of the foreign aid agency.  
They love the Big Plans, the promises of easy solutions, the utopian dreams, the 
side benefits for rich-country political or economic interests, all of which hands 
the aid agency impossible tasks.
12
 
 
If one were to assume Easterly’s view, Canadian ODA is nothing more than an inefficient 
bureaucracy, run by politicians and driven by the incoherent and unreasonable expectations of 
voters.  Even if such a bleak conception of Canadian ODA is accurate, does it follow that it must 
be so? 
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While a serious examination of foreign aid policy may lead Canadians to conclude that 
altruism has no place in an effective development aid policy, it may, on the other hand, lead them 
to recognize that the decades-long persistence of policies that undeniably reflect ethical and 
humanitarian principles cannot be ignored.  In the end, if aid effectiveness has any hope of being 
strengthened, it must be done under both an acknowledgement of the altruistic character of the 
development enterprise, as well as careful thought as to what the desired outcome of Canadian 
development policy ought to be.  Without such an honest assessment, we cannot hope to move 
beyond the justifiably criticized foreign policy statements of the past. 
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